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1236 Michigan Law Review 
LABOR LAW-NLRB Regulation of Employer's 
Pre-Election Captive Audience Speeches 
[Vol. 65 
One of the most effective weapons that an employer may utilize 
to dissuade his employees from accepting unionization is an anti-
union speech delivered to the assembled employees on company time 
and property shortly before a scheduled representation election. 
Two recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decisions 
have provided an opportunity for reopening the much debated 
question of a campaigning union's right to reply under equal op-
portunity conditions to such a captive audience speech.1 In Mc-
Culloch Corp.,2 a union sought to have the unfavorable results of a 
representation election set aside on the ground that the employer's 
refusal to allow an equal reply to his captive audience speech had 
interfered with the holding of a free and fair election. The NLRB, 
sustaining the election, reaffirmed its current doctrine that, absent 
special circumstances, an employer need not grant a union equal 
opportunity to reply to a captive audience speech. Moreover, the 
Board noted that further consideration of this doctrine would be 
deferred until the effect of the accompanying Excelsior decision 
upon union organizational opportunities could be evaluated. In 
Excelsior Underwear Inc.,3 the issue was whether an employer's re-
fusal to provide a campaigning union with the names and addresses 
of employees eligible to vote in a forthcoming representation elec-
tion constituted grounds to set aside that election. Overturning 
existing policy, 4 the Board announced a new rule to be applied 
prospectively in all election cases: within seven days after the direc-
tion of a representation election, the employer must deposit with 
the regional office of the NLRB a list containing the names and 
addresses of employees eligible to vote; failure to comply will be, 
1. Any attempt to list all of the articles written on the question would be unduly 
burdensome. The following are among the more recent and informative: Aaron, 
Employer Free Speech: The Search for Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 28 (Shister, Aaron &: Summers eds. 1962); Bok, The Regulation of Cam• 
paign Tactics in Representative Elections Under the NLRA, 78 HARV. L. REY. 38 
(1964); Burke, Employer Free Speech, 26 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 266 (1957); Christiansen, 
Free Speech, Propaganda and the NLRA, 38 N.Y.U.L. REY. 243 (1963); Gould, The 
Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REY. 73 (1964); Koretz, 
Employer Interference With Union Organization Versus Employer Free Speech, 29 
GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 399 (1960); Pokempner, Employer Free Speech Under the NLRA, 
25 MD. L. R.Ev. 111 (1965). 
2. 156 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 61 L.R.R.M. 1222 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as 
McCulloch]. General Elec. Co., involving essentially similar facts, was decided with 
McCulloch. 
3. 156 N.L.R.B. No. 111, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as Excel• 
sior]. K. L. Kellog b Sons, involving the same issue, was decided with Excelsior. 
4. The employer had previously been required to make available a list of eligible 
employee voters. However, there was no requirement that this list contain addresses. 
See Bok, supra note 1, at 99; Gould, supra note 1, at 100. 
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upon the filing of proper objections by the union, a sufficient basis 
for having the ensuing election set aside. 11 
A union which is denied an opportunity to reply under equal 
circumstances to an employer's captive audience speech may seek 
relief either by charging the employer with an unfair labor practice 
or, as in McCulloch, by instituting a proceeding to invalidate the 
election. The Board's first contacts with the captive audience prob-
lem arose in the context of unfair labor practice charges and con-
sequently the Board's initial efforts to resolve the problem were 
based upon the criteria that determine the existence of an unfair 
labor practice. These criteria are derived from sections 7 and 8 of 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); section 7 guarantees to 
employees a protected right of self-organization;6 section S(a)(l) 
designates as an unfair labor practice employer conduct that coerces 
or restrains employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights;7 and 
section S(c), added to the NLRA in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act, 
provides that an expression of opinion shall not be construed to be 
an unfair labor practice unless it contains threats of reprisal or 
promises of benefit. 8 
The Board's attempts to derive from these three provisions an 
effective means of regulating the captive audience speech have pro-
duced a series of broad mechanical rules.9 Under the original NLRA, 
the Board concluded that any pre-election expression of anti-union 
opinion by an employer, whether or not delivered under captive 
audience conditions, was inherently coercive of his employees' section 
7 rights and thus violative of section S(a)(l).10 In 1941, however, the 
Supreme Court rejected this doctrine of strict neutrality, holding 
5. The requirement was expressly not limited to situations in which the employer 
had initially mailed anti-union literature to his employees and then refused the 
union's request for a mailing list. 
6. National Labor Relations Act § 7, as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 157 (1964). 
7. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(l), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1964). 
8. § 8(c) reads: "The expressing of any views, arguments or opinions or the dissemi-
nation thereof shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under 
any provision of the act, if such expression• contains no threat of reprisal or force or 
promise of benefit." National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), added by 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964). 
9. This tendency to seek a mechanical solution is contrary to the professed desire 
of present Board members to replace the Board's previous per se approach with a 
pragmatic ad hoc technique. See Brown, Free Speech in NLRB Representation Pro-
ceedings, 50 L.R.R.M. 72, 78 (1962); McCulloch, Labor Relations Philosophy of 
Kennedy Administration NLRB Board, 49 L.R.R.M. 74, 75 (1962). 
10. E.g., Rockford Mitten Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 501 (1939); Virginia Ferry Corp., 8 
N.L.R.B. 730 (1938); Nebel Knitting Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 284 (1938); see 1 NLRB ANN. 
REP, 73 (1936). This doctrine of strict neutrality was met with a mixed reaction in 
the circuit courts. The Second Circuit strongly approved. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 
121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941). Other circuits disagreed with the Board. See Press Co. v. 
NLRB, 118 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940); NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 
1940); Continental Box Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1940). 
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that an employer is free to state his position in an election contest 
so long as his communications are not coercive when viewed against 
the whole complex of his pre-election activities.11 Operating under 
this "totality of conduct" approach, the Board addressed itself 
directly to the captive audience characteristics of employer speech 
and, in 1946, in Clark Brothers, adopted a rule of absolute pro-
hibition.12 The Board reasoned that since section 7 guarantees to 
employees the right to receive information relevant to an impending 
election, it must also protect the right not to receive such informa-
tion, 13 and therefore an employer would be acting in derogation of 
protected employee rights whenever he delivered a pre-election 
speech to a captive audience.14 
In 1948, after the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to 
the NLRA, the Board repudiated the Clark Brothers' rule as con-
trary to the legislative intent manifested by section 8(c).15 Only three 
years later, however, in Bonwit Teller, Inc.,16 the Board renewed its 
11; NLRB v. Virginia Elec. &: Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). The Board and the 
courts immediately adopted this "totality of conduct" approach. E.g., NLRB v. Ameri-
can Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943); Oval Wood Dish Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 
1129 (1945); see 11 NLRB ANN. REP. 34 (1946); 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 37 (1945); 
9 NLRB ANN. REP. 37-38 (1944). On employer free speech under the Wagner Act, 
see generally Daykin, Employer's Right of Free Speech Under the NLRA, 40 U. ILL. 
L. REv. 185 (1945); Morgan, Employers Freedom of Speech and the Wagner Act, 20 
TUL. L. REv. 469 (1946). 
12. 70 NL.R.B. 802 (1946). The rule in Clark Bros. was foreshadowed by Board 
dictum in American Tube Bending, 44 N.L.R.B. 121 (1942), which was implicitly 
disapproved by the Second Circuit on review, NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 
134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943). The Board then moved away from the rule, Oval Wood 
Dish Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 1129 (1945); Republic Drill &: Tool, 66 N.L.R.B. 955 (1946), 
until it was announced in Clark Bros. 
13. 70 N.L.R.B. at 805. 
14. When the Board sought enforcement of its order, the Second Circuit gave 
only limited approval to the Clark Bros. doctrine. The court considered the Board's 
rule too broad and indicated that an employer should be allowed to address his 
employees on company time and property, "provided a similar opportunity to address 
them were accorded to union representatives." NLRB v. Clark Bros., 163 F.2d 373, 376 
.(2d Cir. 1947). This was the earliest statement of the equal opportunity theory. 
15. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948); accord, Charroin Mfg. Co., 
88 N.L.R.B. 38 (1950); Kentucky Util. Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 981 (1949); Hinde & Dauch 
Paper Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 488 (1948); Fontaine Converting Works, 77 NL.R.B. 1386 
(1948). Although the legislative history of § 8(c) may be ambiguous in other respects, 
it seems clear that one of the express purposes of the amendment was to reject the 
Clark Bros. doctrine. 
The Board has placed a limited construction upon • . • [judicial opinions gnaran-
teeing freedom of speech on both sides of a labor dispute] by holding such 
speeches by employers to be coercive if •.• the speech was made in the plant 
on working time. The committee believes these decisions to be too restrictive •••• 
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-29 (1947); see Aaron, supra note 1, at 36; 
Cox, Some Aspects of the LMRA, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1, 18-24 (1947); Koretz, supra note 
1, at 403; Pokempner, supra note I, at 114-15. 
16. 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951). In Bonwit Teller, the employer had refused the union 
an equal reply to his captive audience speech and had concurrently enforced a broad 
no-solicitation rule, that is, a company regulation prohibiting employee solicitation 
activities on company property at any time. No-solicitation rules are presumptively 
valid if applied only to working time and presumptively invalid if extended to cover 
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efforts to control the captive audience speech by formulating the 
doctrine of equal opportunity.17 This doctrine ostensibly avoided 
conflict with section S(c) by predicating the finding of an unfair 
labor practice not upon the delivery of a non-coercive speech, but 
rather upon the employer's refusal to allow an equal reply. Accord-
ing to the Board's reasoning, an employee's section 7 right to choose 
a bargaining representative includes the right to hear both sides in 
an election contest under equal circumstances. Therefore, if an 
employer exercises his privilege to deliver a non-coercive captive 
audience speech, he may not deny the union an equal opportunity 
where such a denial would deprive the employees of a reasonable 
chance to hear both sides.18 In practice, the doctrine of equal 
non-working time. Peyton Packing Co., 49 NL.R.B. 828 (1943), approved, Republic 
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). Under special circumstances, a broad 
rule (one that extends to non-working time) will be allowed. Such circumstances exist, 
for example, in a retail store. The presence of customers on the selling floor at all 
times makes a broad rule necessary in order to maintain production and discipline. 
See, e.g., Marshall Field &: Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952); Goldblatt Bros., 77 N.L.R.B. 
1262 (1948); J. L. Hudson Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1403 (1946). Thus, the no-solicitation rule 
enforced by the employer in Bonwit Teller was broad but valid. The above analysis 
applies only to the employer's ability to control employee organizational activity. An 
employer can ban non-employee organizers from the company premises at any time 
so long as the union retains effective communication with the employees through alter-
native channels. NLRB v. Babcock &: Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). See generally 
Vanderheyden, Employee Solicitation and Distribution-A Second Look, 14 LAB. L.J. 
781 (1963); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1049 (1964). 
17. The Board's announcement of the doctrine of equal opportunity had been 
anticipated by the Second Circuit in its modification of the Clark Bros. rule. See note 
14 supra. However, the Board had not immediately adopted the circuit court's theory 
as a replacement of the defunct Clark Bros. doctrine. In S. &: S. Corrugated Paper Mach. 
Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950), it refused to accept the argument that an employer must 
allow a union equal opportunity to reply to a captive audience speech. Consequently, 
when the Board did adopt the equal opportunity theory, it expressly overruled the 
s. ;,, S. case. 
It has been argued that the doctrine of equal opportunity was merely the dis-
credited Clark Bros. rule in "scant disguise." Livingston Shirt Co., 107 NL.R.B. 400 
(1953). However, there is a definite theoretical difference between the two: the Clark 
Bros. doctrine was based upon the right of the employees not to hear campaign 
propaganda; the equal opportunity doctrine is predicated upon the employees' right 
to hear all such propaganda under equal circumstances. This theoretical distinction 
has a significant practical effect: under the former rule, the employer is absolutely 
prohibited from delivering a captive audience speech; under the latter, his right of 
speech is preserved, but made contingent upon an allowance of equal opportunity to 
the union. See Aaron, supra note I, at 37. 
18. A second ground for the Board's decision in Bonwit Teller was the employer's 
discriminatory application of his broad no-solicitation rule. An otherwise valid no-
solicitation rule becomes illegal if applied discriminatorily. See, e.g., NLRB v. Link-
Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 224-26 
(1940); cf. Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). This principle had 
generally been invoked when an employer discriminated between competing unions, 
but in Bonwit Teller it was extended to reach the situation in which an employer 
uses the company premises as a campaign forum while denying the same opportunity 
to his employees. It was this narrow holding which ultimately gained judicial approval. 
Bonwit Teller v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952). On appeal, the court indicated 
that, if the employer abandoned the broad rule, he would have no obligation to 
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opportunity became a mechanical rule, guaranteeing to a union an 
equal reply whenever the employer delivered a captive audience 
speech.19 
In 1953, a change in Board personnel resulted in the rejection 
of the equal opportunity doctrine and the formulation of the rule 
which presently controls the finding of an unfair labor practice in a 
captive audience case.20 In Livingston Shirt Corp.,21 the reconsti-
tuted Board reasoned that if an employer's right to deliver a non-
coercive speech to his employees on company time and property is 
contingent upon his granting a union the same opportunity, the 
right of unrestricted non-coercive speech guaranteed by section 
8(c) has been so encumbered that the right itself has been negated.22 
Accordingly, the Board held that, absent a broad no-solicitation rule 
(an employer enforced regulation prohibiting all employee solicita• 
grant the union an equal reply to his captive audience speech. Id. at 646. But see 
Judge Swann's dissenting argument that the employer could not be held to have dis-
criminatorily applied his no-solicitation rule because such a holding would infringe 
upon the right of non-coercive speech protected by § 8(c). Any doubt that the equal 
opportunity rule had been disapproved was dispelled by the Second Circuit's subse-
quent decision in NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 205 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1953). 
19. As originally stated in Bonwit Teller, the equal opportunity doctrine was to 
be applied on a case-by-case basis where special circumstances existed that made an 
equal reply necessary. 96 N.L.R.B. at 612. There were several special circumstances 
present in Bonwit Teller that could have served as natural limitations upon future 
application of the doctrine: the employer had enforced a broad no-solicitation rule, 
the employer had committed other unfair labor practices in the period, an election 
was pending, and the speech was delivered shortly before the election. However, in a 
series of subsequent decisions, the Board ignored these factors and transformed the 
Bonwit Teller rule into a doctrine of mechanical equivalence. See Metropolitan Auto 
Parts Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1634, 1636 (1953) ("The conclusion is inevitable that when an 
employer uses company time and premises to make a pre-election speech, he must 
permit, upon request, an equal forum to union spokesman''); National Screw &: Mfg. 
Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1360 (1952); Onondaga Pottery Co., 100 NL.R.B. 1143 (1952); Hig• 
gins, Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 829 (1952); Biltmore Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 905 (1951). 
20. Two members retired, including Chairman Herzog. They were replaced by 
Eisenhower appointees: Member Rodgers and Chairman Farmer. These two were part 
of the majority that overruled Bonwit Teller. For discussions of the political overtones 
of this reversal, see MCGUINESS, THE NEW FRONTIER NLRB 30-40 (1963); Aaron, supra 
note I, at 37; Mittenthal, Employer Speech-A Life Cycle, 5 LAB. L.J. 101, 107 (1954); 
Wirtz, Board Policy and Labor-Management Relations: "Employer Persuasion," 7th 
N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 79 (1954). 
21. 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953). 
22. The majority did not deny the union's right to an equal opportunity but 
felt that the traditional means of union-employee communication were adequate for 
this purpose. For a sharp attack on this reasoning, see Aaron, supra note 1, at 51. 
Member Murdock, in dissent, argued for affirmation of equal opportunity, asserting 
in a well documented opinion that no customary union campaign media could 
counteract the powerful impact of an employer's captive audience speech, and that 
without a union rebuttal under similar conditions, there could be no equal oppor-
tunity. Member Peterson, concurring in the decision, did not consider § 8(c) to be 
involved in the case. He returned to the theory of the Second Circuit in Bonwit 
Teller v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952) (see note 18 supra), concluding that there 
could be no violation unless the employer discriminatorily applied a broad no-
solicitation rule. For a good discussion of all of the opinions in Livingston Shirt, see 
Mittenthal, supra note 20. 
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tion activities on company property),23 an employer does not commit 
an unfair labor practice by delivering a captive audience speech and 
denying the union an equal opportunity to reply.24 Underlying this 
rule is the assumption that, so long as the opportunity for in-plant, 
pro-union activity is not eliminated, a union will be able to counter-
act the effect of a captive audience speech through traditional chan-
nels of union-employee communication. Recent Board decisions 
indicate that, under the Livingston Shirt rule, the right of a union 
to reply to a captive audience speech turns mechanically upon the 
presence or absence of a broad no-solicitation rule. 25 
Livingston Shirt delineated the circumstances under which an 
employer's refusal to allow a rebuttal to his captive audience speech 
could constitute an unfair labor practice, but it left unanswered the 
substantially different question raised in a representation case 
such as McCulloch: when will the employer's refusal to allow a 
2!l. See note 16 supra for a discussion of no-solicitation rules. The exception for 
situations in which the employer enforces a broad no-solicitation rule seems incon-
sistent with the reasoning by which the majority overruled Bonwit Teller. If § 8(c) 
provides a protection for non-coercive speech, then exercise of the § 8(c) privilege 
should not be made contingent upon the breadth of the employer's no-solicitation 
rule. See Brown, Employer Free Speech and the No-Solicitation Rule, 6 LAB. L.J. 
710, 718 (1955). However, leaving the exception for broad no-solicitation rules does 
allow the Livingston Shirt decision to be reconciled with the Second Circuit's holdings 
in Bonwit Teller and NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 205 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 
195!!). See note 18 supra. 
24. The Livingston Shirt rule encountered almost immediate judicial disapproval. 
In NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth, 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954), the Sixth Circuit carried 
the reasoning of the Board's majority to a logical extreme, holding that § 8(c) provides 
absolute protection to employer non-coercive speech regardless of the breadth of his 
no-solicitation rule. Thus, contrary to the implication of the Livingston Shirt rule, the 
court found that an employer does not commit an unfair labor practice by denying 
a union equal opportunity while concurrently enforcing a broad no-solicitation rule. 
Accord, NLRB v. Bonwit Teller, 197 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1952) (Swann, J., dissenting); 
see note 17 supra. However, this absolute interpretation of § 8(c) was subsequently 
expressly refuted by the D.C. Circuit, United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593, 
599-600 (D.C. Cir. 1956), and implicitly disapproved by the Supreme Court, NLRB 
v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958). See Aaron, supra note I, at 44-46; 
Koretz, supra note 1, at 408. 
25. It was immediately obvious that the Board would not find an unfair labor 
practice where an employer refused a union equal opportunity unless the employer 
also enforced a broad no-solicitation rule. See Williamson Dickie Mfg. Co., 115 
N.L.R.B. 356 (1956); Johnston Lawn Mower Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1955 (1954); Deter-
gents, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1334 (1954). However, it was not clear whether the Board 
would automatically find an unfair labor practice where the employer did enforce 
such a rule. See Koretz, supra note 1, at 405. This question was answered in May 
Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), wherein the Board indicated that if an 
employer chooses to enforce a broad no-solicitation rule, he cannot refuse a union 
the right to an equal reply to his captive audience speech. The Board justified this 
holding on the theory that the Livingston Shirt decision had actually left the Bonwit 
Teller rule in force with respect to department stores with broad no-solicitation rules. 
Id. at 800. This interpretation of Livingston Shirt was subsequently affirmed by the 
Board in Montgomery Ward & Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964). See note !l6 infra and 
accompanying text for further discussion of these cases. 
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union rebuttal justify the setting aside of an election.26 The Board 
has indicated that representation elections are to be conducted under 
ideal laboratory conditions that will assure to the employee-voters 
a free and untrammeled choice for or against unionization.27 Con-
sequently, when the relief sought by a union or employer is only the 
invalidation of an election, the sole issue which the Board will con-
sider is whether the pre-election activity of the contestants had upset 
those delicately balanced conditions.28 Section 8(c), which by its 
terms applies only to unfair labor practice cases and upon which 
Livingston Shirt was based, will not protect an employer's non-coer-
cive expression of opinion from being construed as an impediment 
to employee free choice.29 Accordingly, in Peerless Plywood Co.,80 
decided with Livingston Shirt, the Board formulated an independ-
ent rule to be applied in election cases, pursuant to which both 
26. In Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953), the Board said: 
We are now called upon to decide what our rule will be in an election case in 
the light of our Livingston Shirt decision. We have abandoned the Bonwit Teller 
doctrine in complaint cases. But this does not, however, dispose of the problem as 
it affects the conduct of an election. 
27. The Board stated in General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948), that its 
function in a representation election is to "provide a laboratory in which an experi-
ment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, in order to 
determine the uninhibited desires of the employees." 
28. See, e.g., Oak Mfg. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1963); Lord Baltimore Press, 142 
N.L.R.B. 328 (1963). 
29. See Metropolitan Ins. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 935 (1950), wherein the Board said that 
"Section 8(c) does not .•• prevent the Board from finding in a representation case 
that an expression of views, whether or not protected by Section 8(c), has, in fact, 
interfered with the employees' freedom of choice •••• " Under the Eisenhower Board, 
however, the theory of General Shoe was all but abandoned. See, e.g., National 
Furniture Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1 (1957); Lux Clock Mfg. Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1955); 
Esquire Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1954); American Laundry Mach. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 
511 (1954). See also Burke, supra note 1, at 277; 21 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 72 (1956). But, 
the present Board has revived the General Shoe doctrine, expressly overruled the 
cases that cast doubt upon its vitality, and stated that § 8(c) "has no application to 
representation cases." Dal Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1787 n.11 (1962); see, 
e.g., Oak Mfg. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1963); Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). 
The greatest effect of the resurgence of the General Shoe doctrine has not been 
upon the captive audience cases but rather upon the standards which the Board will 
apply to determine if the content of an employer's speech has created an impediment 
to the conduct of the election. For discussion of the problem, see generally Bok, 
supra note 1, at 66-92; Pokempner, supra note 1, at 128-47; Note, NLRA Elections: 
Post Election Objections, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 288 (1965). The representation case test has 
been attacked by one commentator as vague and likely to lead to purely subjective 
decision-making by the Board. See Christiansen, supra note 1, at 274-75. Other critics 
have defended the test as necessary to protect employee free choice. See Brown, 
Free Speech in NLRB Representation Proceedings, 50 L.R.R.M. 72, 74 (1962); Fields, 
Pre-election Conduct and Free Speech, 14 LAB. L.J. 967, 973 (1963); Platt, Rules on 
Free Speech Under Taft-Hartley Act, 55 L.R.R.M. 105, 108-10 (1964). Despite the fact 
that representation cases are not generally subject to judicial review, the General Shoe 
doctrine has received some support from the courts. See NLRB v. Houston Chronicle 
Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, 224 
F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1955). 
30. 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953). 
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union and employer are prohibited from delivering captive audience 
speeches within twenty-four hours of a representation election.31 
The use of broad mechanical rules, which the Board has ap-
parently favored in the captive audience area, has two significant 
advantages: it removes from the already overworked Board the 
burden of extended case-by-case factual analysis and it provides the 
interested parties with notice of the precise limits of permissible 
conduct. However, in 1958, in NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nu-
tone Inc.),32 the Supreme Court implicitly disapproved of this mech-
anistic approach to the captive audience problem.33 Although Nu-
tone did not involve a captive audience speech, the basic issue was 
similar to that which is raised in the captive audience cases: under 
what circumstances must an employer allow a union equal access 
to the campaign media through which he has presented his anti-
union views. 34 The Court indicated that the proper approach would 
31, The 24-hour prohibition was based on the theory "that last-minute speeches 
by either employer or union delivered to massed assemblies of employees on company 
time have an unwholesome and unsettling effect and tend to interfere with that sober 
and thoughtful choice which a free election is designed to reflect." Peerless Plywood 
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953). Subsequent decisions have modified and refined 
the rule, but have not altered it in substance. See Koretz, supra note I, at 409-10; 
Pokempner, supra note 1, at 120. 
32. 357 U.S. 357 (1958). The case came to the Supreme Court as a consolidation of 
two separate cases. In Nutone Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1955), the employer had enforced 
a valid no-distribution rule while concurrently distributing anti-union literature on 
plant premises. The Board held that the employer had not committed an unfair labor 
practice, relying upon Livingston Shirt and asserting that § 8(c) protected from restric-
tion the employer's right to disseminate information non-coercively. On review, the 
D.C. Circuit reversed, rejecting the argument that § 8(c) creates an absolute privilege 
and reasoning that if the employer distributed on company property, there could be 
no valid reason to prohibit the employees from doing the same. United Steelworkers v. 
NLRB, 243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1956). In Avondale Mills, 115 N.L.R.B. 840 (1956), the 
Board found an employer guilty of an unfair labor practice when he enforced a valid 
no-solicitation rule while engaging in solicitation activities himself. On appeal, the 
Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order. NLRB v. Avondale Mills, 242 F.2d 
669 (5th Cir. 1957). 
33. The court said that the unions "are not entitled to use a medium of commu-
nication simply because the employer is using it .••• No such mechanical answers will 
avail for the solution of this non-mechanical, complex problem in labor-management 
relations." NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958). There seems to be 
a consensus among the commentators that the Nutone opinion constituted a clear 
disapproval of the Board's past and present policy in regard to captive audience 
speeches and that it represented a Supreme Court mandate for an ad hoc factual 
analysis of each captive audience case. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note I, at 46; Cox, 
Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1958 A.B.A. REP. 12, 26-
29 (1958); Koretz, supra note 1, at 408-09; Note, Limitations on Employer Conduct 
During Union Organizational Campaigns-A Survey, 19 VAND. L. REv. 438, 445 (1966). 
34. The Court described the narrow issue before it as derived 
from the claim that, when the employer himself engages in anti-union solicitation 
that if engaged in by employees would constitute a violation of (the employer's 
no-solicitation rule] ••• his enforcement of an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule 
against the employees is itself an unfair labor practice. 
357 U.S. at 362. 
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be an inquiry into the circumstances of each case to determine 
whether the employer's refusal to allow the union access to the 
desired campaign media did in fact upset the balance of campaign 
opportunities.35 However, despite this apparent Supreme Court 
mandate for a case-by-case analysis, the Board has indicated in recent 
decisions that it will continue to adhere to the mechanical rules of 
Livingston Shirt and Peerless Plywood.86 
The Supreme Court recognized in Nutone that the complex fac-
tual components of election communications problems are not amen-
able to regulation by broad mechanical rules. A union demands 
equal opportunity because it fears that an unrebutted captive au-
dience speech will afford the employer an insurmountable campaign 
advantage. The difficult factual question in every case must therefore 
be whether, given the refusal of the employer to allow an equal 
reply, the union retains access to alternative channels of commu-
nication through which it can establish an equilibrium of campaign 
opportunities.37 The ad hoc case-by-case approach suggested by Nu-
tone, although probably the most accurate, would nonetheless be 
inimical to the need for administrative expertise and the desirability 
of providing both union and employer with clear guidelines for pre-
election behavior. This fundamental conflict between administrative 
and substantive considerations can be satisfactorily resolved only 
through the formulation of a regulatory standard that is both suf-
35. The Nutone opinion was foreshadowed by the Supreme Court's decision in 
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). There, the question was whether 
an employer could validly prohibit non-employee union organizers from distributing 
literature on his property. The Court held that the employer had this privilege so 
long as the union retained access to effective alternative channels of communication. 
Since rebuttal of a captive audience speech generally involves allowing non-employee 
organizers on plant premises, the Babcock-Wilcox opinion seems to reinforce the 
conclusion of the Court in Nutone. Both decisions point to a case-by-case "alternative 
channels" analysis. 
36. In May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), the Board found that an 
employer had committed an unfair labor practice by denying a union the right to an 
equal reply to his captive audience speech while concurrently enforcing a broad no• 
solicitation rule. The Board sought to reconcile this holding with Nutone by declaring 
that the employer's conduct had created a "glaring imbalance" of organizational 
opportunities. However, Members Leedom and Rodgers in dissent pointed out that 
the Board had made no real factual findings and had apparently revived the mechan• 
ical equal opportunity doctrine for application to situations in which the employer 
enforced a broad no-solicitation rule. Consequently, on review, the Sixth Circuit 
refused to enforce the Board's order on the ground that the unfair labor practice 
holding was not supported by the proper factual findings. May Dep't Stores Co. v. 
NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963). Despite this strong judicial disapproval, the 
Board has since reaffirmed the theory of the May case and has, in so doing, expressly 
stated its disagreement with the Sixth Circuit. Montgomery Ward & Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 
846 (1964). Ironically, the Sixth Circuit enforced the Board's order in the latter case, 
distinguishing it from May on the ground that the no-solicitation rule enforced by 
the employer was invalid. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 
1965); see Christiansen, supra note I, at 273; Pokempner, supra note 1, at 122, 125-27; 
cf. S. H. Grossingers, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 61 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1965). 
37. This is, in essence, the test of Nutone. 
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ficiently flexible to adjust to the factual realities of the captive au-
dience situation and sufficiently precise to be workable from the 
standpoint of practical administration. 
Unfortunately, the Board's various attempts to control the 
captive audience speech have fallen short of this ideal regulatory 
standard. The doctrine of equal opportunity was based on the as-
sumption that the union's available alternative channels of commu-
nication could never be sufficient to offset the effect of a captive 
audience speech.38 Unquestionably, the captive audience speech is 
a uniquely effective campaign weapon.39 As a purely practical matter, 
it provides an employer with the invaluable opportunity to commu-
nicate partisan propaganda to all of the voters simultaneously at 
the closest possible moment to the election. As to campaign psy-
chology, it affords the employer a significant advantage in the vitally 
important area of personal contact propaganda;40 while the employer 
has the voters virtually trapped in his campaign headquarters, the 
union must struggle to achieve personal contact by house-to-house 
canvassing of the electorate or by mass meetings on non-working 
time.41 Most important, however, is that the captive audience speech 
is the medium through which the employer can most effectively exert 
the tremendous economic and social leverage inherent in his au-
thoritarian position. The average working man, dependent upon the 
company for continuance of his security and satisfaction, may derive 
from the employer's expression of opinion a force far greater than 
mere persuasion.42 However, notwithstanding the foregoing factors, 
38. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. Compare Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 
N.L.R.B. 608, 612 (1951), with Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1953). 
39. For defense of the doctrine of equal opportunity, see Livingston Shirt Co., 107 
N.L.R.B. 400, 410 (1953) (Murdock, dissenting); Note, 61 YALE L.J. 1067, 1074-80 (1952). 
See also the recent report of the House subcommittee on the NLRB wherein it was 
stated that: 
In many situations, an employer utilizes the captive audience speech to present 
his views to his employees on company time and property and in contrast, the 
union is deprived of all effective techniques and media for communication with 
the employees. • • • The subcommittee recommends that the labor board re-
examine its Livingston Shirt doctrine with an eye to adopting a policy of equal 
opportunity in presentation of issues. 
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NLRB, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF 
THE LMRA BY THE NLRB 98-99 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as HouSE 
REPORT]. 
40. There appears to be general agreement among the social and political scientists 
that personal contact is an extremely effective form of propaganda. See Doon, Punuc 
OPINION AND PROPAGANDA 460-61, 529 (1948); Eldersveld, Experimental Propaganda 
Techniques and Voting Behavior, in PoLmCAL BEHAVIOR (Eulau, Eldersveld & Jano-
witz eds. 1956); l.AzARSFELD, BERELSON & GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE 150-52 (1944). 
41. See HOUSE REPORT at 57-58, wherein a union attorney described the difficulties 
encountered by the union in attempting to make contact with the employees during 
the organization of the May Department Store chain in Cleveland. 
42. For discussion of the impact of employer captive audience communications 
upon employees, see Livingston Shirt Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 409 (1953) (Murdock, 
dissenting); Note, 61 YALE L.J. 1067, 1074-80 (1953); Note, 14 U. Cru. L. REv. 104 
(1947). See also Doon, op. cit. supra note 40, at 371; HOVLAND, JANIS & KELLY, Co111-
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an unrebutted captive audience speech should not invariably pre-
determine an imbalance of communications opportunities. When 
the speech is delivered well in advance of the election and the em-
ployee unit is small, the union might have a reasonable opportunity 
to counteract its effect by means of traditional alternative channels: 
solicitation or distribution activities by professional union organizers 
at mass meetings, at the plant gate, or at the employee's homes; 
solicitation or distribution activities by employees on company prem-
ises during non-working time (absent a broad no-solicitation rule); 
and dissemination of propaganda through the mails. 
The current Livingston-Peerless formula does not fare any better 
when subjected to a similar analysis. The Peerless Plywood rule is 
based upon an essentially valid premise-namely, the possibility of 
neutralizing captive audience propaganda decreases as the election 
draws nearer. However, the insulated period established by the rule 
is unrealistically short;43 the twenty-four hour prohibition will 
neither guarantee that the employer's words will have lost their force 
by the time of the election nor assure the union of sufficient oppor-
tunity to communicate an effective rebuttal through alternative 
channels. Similarly, while the pivotal factor under the Livingston 
Shirt rule-the breadth of the employer's no-solicitation rule-is a 
significant element to consider in evaluating the availability of al-
ternative channels, the presence or absence of such a rule should not 
be conclusive as to the union's ability to counteract the effect of a 
captive audience speech.44 If the union lacks an organized contingent 
MUNICATION AND PERSUASION 20 (1953). Of course, the actual effect of an employer 
speech will depend, to a large extent, upon the nature of the employer-employee 
relation in the particular plant. "Words which may only antagonize a hard bitten 
truck driver in Detroit may seriously intimidate the rural textile worker." Cox, LAnoll 
AND THE NATIONAL LAnoR POLICY 44 (1960). Employer propaganda has been most 
effective in the South where company power still reigns supreme. See Roy, Unioni%1ltion 
in the South, 15 LAil. L.J. 451 (1964); Zivalich, Process of Unioni%1ltion in the South, 
15 LAn. L.J. 468 (1964). 
43. Willard Wirtz described the Peerless Plywood rule as creating "an almost 
absurdly artificial distinction which will only be prevented from causing endless liti-
gation by the fact that most employers will feel that their words will carry for 25 
hours as well as for 23." Wirtz, Board Policy and Labor Management Relations: 
Employer Persuasion, 7th N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAD. 79, 97 (1954); see Peerless Plywood 
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 433 (Murdock, dissenting); Aaron, supra note 1, at 51 (the 
assumption underlying the rule is "arrant nonsense'); Christiansen, supra note 1, 
at 277-78; Gould, supra note I, at 91 ("the 24 hour period is unrealistically short'). 
But see Platt, supra note 29, at 113, defending the rule. 
44. In the absence of a broad rule, the employees may carry on organizational 
activities during breaks, at lunch, or in the washrooms. These opportunities do not 
necessarily guarantee the success of union efforts to counteract the effect of a captive 
audience speech. See Bok, supra note I, at 97-98. As to whether the presence of a broad 
rule invariably thwarts union attempts to balance the impact of a captive audience 
speech, compare May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), with Montgomery 
Ward&: Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964). In both cases, the employer was found to have 
committed an unfair labor practice by denying a union the right to an equal reply 
to his captive audience speech while concurrently enforcing a broad rule. But, in 
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in the plant or if the speech is delivered shortly before the election, 
the absence of a prohibition against employee solicitation activities 
may not greatly enhance the union's chances of restoring a balance 
of propaganda communications. By the same token, when an em-
ployee unit is relatively small and the employer delivers his speech 
well in advance of the election, the prohibition of in-plant employee 
solicitation should not necessarily preclude the union from effec-
tively combatting the employer's propaganda through alternative 
channels. 
In McCulloch, the Board was presented with an opportunity to 
re-examine its heretofore unsatisfactory captive audience policy.45 
Because the complaining union sought only the invalidation of an 
election, the case was subject to representation case standards. How-
ever, since the employer's speech was not delivered within the 
twenty-four hour prohibited period, the Peerless Plywood rule was 
inapposite. The Board could have seized upon this situation to 
create a new rule, based upon representation case criteria, for appli-
cation to all pre-election captive audience speeches. Instead, ad-
hering to its recent practice, the Board applied the Livingston Shirt 
unfair labor practice doctrine to this representation case and, finding 
that the employer had not enforced a broad no-solicitation rule, sus-
tained the election.40 In order to justify its decision, the Board as-
serted that reconsideration of the captive audience problem should 
be deferred until an evaluation could be had of the effect of Excelsior 
upon the balance of pre-election communications opportunities. 
However, it is questionable whether the union's new-found access 
to a list of employee names and addresses, which admittedly repre-
sents a valuable campaign asset, will actually alter the fundamental 
nature of the problem.47 Union propaganda efforts through the 
May there were 3,000 employees involved and the store was in a large city, while in 
Montgomery Ward, there were only 50 employees, the store was located in a small 
town in which the union had a hall, and the employees ate lunch in a public 
cafeteria. It seems doubtful that the presence of a broad rule would have the same 
impact on the balance of campaign opportunities in both cases, See also Aaron, supra 
note I, at 51; Burke, supra note 1, at 288-90; Gould, supra note 1, at 146. 
45. The complaining union, recognizing that there was no prospect of relief under 
the Livingston-Peerless formula (the employer had neither delivered his speech during 
the 24-hour prohibited period nor concurrently enforced a broad no-solicitation rule), 
argued for a re-appraisal of the law. Going beyond the old doctrine of equal oppor-
tunity, the union advocated adoption of a rule which would allow the campaigning 
union access to company property any time the employer used the premises for his 
anti-union activities. 
46. Since Livingston Shirt, the Board has not held an employer's refusal to allow 
an equal reply to his captive audience speech to be grounds for finding an unfair 
labor practice or setting aside an election except where the employer concurrently 
enforced a broad no-solicitation rule or an unlawful no-solicitation rule. See Mont-
gomery Ward &: Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964); May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 
(1962). In both cases, the Board followed the Livingston Shirt standard despite the 
that the legality of a rule must depend on a case-by-case "alternative channels" 
47. See Bok, supra note 1, at 99-100; Gould, supra note I, at 148. 
1248 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65 
mails, which will necessarily be more efficient after Excelsior, may 
not be an effective counterbalance to the personal contact persuasion 
of a captive audience speech.48 The union's increased capacity to 
reach the employees in their homes will point toward an equaliza-
tion of personal contact opportunities, but if the employee unit is 
large and the employer's speech is delivered shortly before the elec-
tion, the list of employee names and addresses will be a doubtful 
replacement for an equal reply. 
Had the Board chosen to take full advantage of the distinction 
between representation and unfair labor practice cases, it would 
have been able to fashion a more satisfactory rule for the regulation 
of the captive audience speech. Two legal barriers block the develop-
ment of a workable and realistic regulatory standard: the free speech 
guarantees of section S(c) and the Supreme Court's Nutone decision. 
Section S(c) inhibits realistic treatment of the captive audience 
speech by casting doubt upon the legality of any conditioning of the 
employer's right to deliver a non-coercive address to his employees. 
Nutone impedes the development of an administratively practical 
approach in that it represents a disapproval of the use of mechanical 
rules. However, both of these barriers could be circumvented by a 
regulatory formula conceived in terms of representation case stand-
ards.49 Although the distinction between unfair labor practice and 
representation cases may be subject to challenge, it has been noted 
above that Board policy is now firmly established to the effect that 
section S(c) will not apply when the only issue before the Board is 
whether there has been interference with the conduct of an elec-
tion.50 The Nutone precedent is a more difficult obstacle to over-
come,51 but Excelsior may be construed to indicate that Nutone will 
not control in a representation case. In Excelsior, the employer, re-
lying on Nutone, had argued that he could not be required to allow 
the union access to a particular communications medium (in this 
case, an employee mailing list), unless it had been factually estab-
lished that in the particular case the union could not reach the em-
ployees with equal effectiveness through alternative channels.112 In 
48. For authorities discussing the superiority of personal contact as a propaganda 
medium, see note 40 supra. 
49. See Gould, supra note I, at 146-47. 
50. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text. 
51. Several commentators have observed that the mandate of Nutone could prob-
ably be avoided through the use of presumptions and by phrasing unfair labor 
practice findings in terms of a factual analysis. See Aaron, supra note 1, at 46; Cox, 
supra note 33, at 26-29; Koretz, supra note 1, at 409. But see May Dep't Stores v. 
NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th cir. 1963), wherein the court refused to accept presumptions 
or "magic words" as substitutes for factual findings. 
52. A similar situation is created by the effect of the Nutone decision upon the 
tests applicable to no-solicitation and no-distribution rules. Relying upon Nutone, 
employers have argued that the traditional presumptions are no longer valid and 
that the legality of a rule must depend on a case-by-case "alternative channels" 
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rejecting this argument, the Board intially distinguished Nutone by 
pointing out that, in Excelsior, the opening to the union of the de-
sired communications channel would not result, as it would have in 
Nutone, in the invasion of any substantial employer interest.58 Ob-
viously, this distinction would not be applicable to the captive au-
dience situation in which the employer's property rights are very 
definitely involved. However, the Board added that Nutone was also 
inapposite because it dealt with the circumstances under which the 
Board might find that an employer had committed an unfair labor 
practice, whereas Excelsior posed the substantially different issue of 
the circumstances under which the Board might set aside an elec-
tion.154 The Board thus indicated that in a representation case it need 
not investigate the existence or availability of alternative channels but 
rather that it could establish simplified rules for general application. 
As noted earlier, satisfactory control of the captive audience 
speech depends upon the development of a regulatory standard that 
will draw an administratively practical line between the circum-
stances in which an equal reply is necessary in order to maintain a 
balance of communications opportunities and the circumstances in 
which this desired balance can be secured by the union through the 
use of traditional alternative channels. In McCulloch, the crucial 
factors which could designate the co-ordinates of such a line were 
touched upon but ultimately ignored by the Board. Perhaps inspired 
by Professor Derek Bok's analysis of the captive audience problem,55 
the Board originally stipulated three questions as a focus for argu-
ment: (1) Can a free and fair election be held when an employer 
delivers a captive audience speech and the union is denied an equal 
opportunity to reply? (2) If an equal reply is necessary, what is the 
crucial time period prior to the election in which such a reply should 
analysis. One circuit has accepted this argument. NLRB v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 271 
F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1959). The Board and two other circuits have expressly rejected it. 
United Aircraft Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 39 (1962); NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 
F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Time-O-Matic, 264 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1959). The 
opinion of the Second Circuit in United Aircraft reveals the fundamental problem of 
the ad hoc "alternative channels" analysis: 
It might be suggested that it would be harmless to require the Board to make 
findings in all no-solicitation cases. But in addition to being an appreciable 
increase in the Board's already unwieldy work load, this would simply be an 
incitement to litigation and casuistry. 
324 F.2d at 130. 
53. The absence of a significant employer interest is evidenced by the fact that 
the employer in Excelsior based his strongest argument upon the possibility of invasion 
of employee rights. 
54. The Board also suggested a third distinction between Excelsior and Nutone: 
while Nutone was unlimited in scope of application, Excelsior was to be applied 
only to situations in which a representation election had been directed. 
55. Professor Bok proposed that "in elections involving seventy-five or more em-
ployees, the employer could not deliver to his employees during working time within 
the last seven days of the campaign." Bok, supra note 1, at 102; see id. at 96-103. 
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be required? (3) Is the size of the employee unit material?56 This 
analytical framework suggests an approach to the problem which has 
been clearly foreshadowed by the preceding discussion: When an 
employee unit is small and the captive audience speech is delivered 
well in advance of the election, an equal reply should not be neces-
sary to maintain the desired balance; conversely, when the unit is 
large and the speech delivered immediately prior to the election, use 
of alternative channels cannot be relied upon to counter the effect 
of the speech. 
With these propositions as a foundation, it is submitted that the 
following regulatory standard would be both attuned to the realities 
of the captive audience situation and workable from an administra-
tive standpoint: When a representation election has been directed 
in an employee unit exceeding in size a certain designated number 
(to be determined by the Board) and the employer delivers a captive 
audience speech within a set number of days prior to the election 
(to be determined by the Board), a presumption will arise in favor 
of election interference unless the employer honors the union's re-
quest for an equal opportunity.57 Although the purposes of ad-
ministrative convenience would be best served by an absolute rule, 
it seems more commensurate with the realities of the situation to 
allow the employer an opportunity to rebut the presumption. How-
ever, the opportunity for rebuttal should not provide a springboard 
for a full-blown case-by-case analysis, for such a result would defeat 
the purpose of the rule. Instead, the Board should construe the pre-
sumption as conclusive in the absence of a showing by the employer 
that, in fact, the union did have extended personal contact with a 
a substantial majority of the employees through professsional union 
organizers at ~ time sufficiently close to both the election and the 
employer's speech to indicate the existence of a real equality of op-
portunity. 58 
Since McCulloch was a representation case and since the Board 
actually had the conceptual framework upon which to build a satis-
factory regulatory standard, it is unfortunate that the Board did not 
56. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. lll, 61 L.R.R.1\1. 1217 (1966). 
57. Several other possible solutions have been suggested: Extend the Peerless Ply• 
wood rule to seven days or, alternatively, change the rule to make an equal reply 
mandatory within the seven-day period. See Gould, supra note I, at 147. Presume an 
unfair labor practice whenever an employer refuses to allow a union equal oppor-
tunity, but allow the employer an opportunity to rebut the presumption. See Burke, 
supra note I, at 288-90. An interesting practical solution was achieved recently 
without the aid of the NLRB by an employer who, wishing to avoid the restrictions 
placed on pre-election conduct by the NLRB, challenged the campaigning union to 
a debate on neutral territory. The debate was held, the employer won the election, 
and the union had no complaint. Transport Topics, April 18, 1966, p. I. 
58. So limited, the rebuttal opportunity woulc'~ serve to preclude the situation in 
which a union could use the proposed rule to invalidate an election despite the 
fact that it did have the equivalent of an equal opportunity to reply. 
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seize the opportunity to develop finally a realistic and workable treat-
ment of the captive audience speech.119 
59. Applying the proposed formula to the two cases consolidated within the 
McCulloch decision produces an interesting result. In McCulloch, there were 1,315 
eligible voters and the employer's captive audience speech was delivered two days 
prior to the election. In General Elec. Co., there were 72 eligible voters and the speech 
was delivered seven days before the election. It is probable that the proposed rule 
would call for an equal reply in the former case but not in the latter. 
